Abstract-Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) has been recently one of the more popular applications in Internet technology. It benefits lower cost of equipment, operation, and better integration with data applications than voice communications over telephone networks. However, the voice packets delivered over the Internet are not protected. The session initiation protocol (SIP) is widely used signaling protocol that controls communications on the Internet, typically using hypertext transport protocol (HTTP) digest authentication, which is vulnerable to many forms of attacks. This paper proposes a new secure authentication and key agreement scheme based on Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) and Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) named (ECDSA). Security analysis demonstrates that the proposed scheme can resist various attacks and it can be applied to authenticate the users with different SIP domains.
Introduction
Voice over IP (VoIP) networks attract great attention since they can provide low cost, deployment and maintenance, flexible implementation, and new applications than conventional telephones [1] . The session initiation protocol (SIP) is an application-layer signaling protocol based on HTTP-like request/response exchange for initiating, managing and terminate voice session. Authentication is an important security requirement when a user wants to access the SIP services. However, the original authentication scheme for SIP does not provide strong security, because it works based on HTTP-digest authentication [2] , which is vulnerable to several attacks such as impersonation attacks, offline password guessing attacks and server spoofing attacks etc. Therefore, with the widespread use of VoIP in worldwide, the security of SIP has received much attention from several studies. The remainder of this paper is outlined as follows. The related work is shown in Section 2. Section 3 provides some basic preliminaries and notations used in this paper. Section 4 shows proposed scheme. Section 5 analyzes presented solution. Section 6 shows the performance and functionality comparisons with other related works. The conclusion is given in Section 7.
Related Work
Since Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) provides a smaller key size than any other cryptosystem and has faster computations than half of other public key systems [3] . Several protocols for SIP server based on ECC have been proposed to strength the security and performance of VoIP communication.
In [2] Yang pointed out that HTTP digests authentication protocol is vulnerable to offline password guessing attacks, and the spoofing attacks. They proposed a SIP authentication protocol based on Diffie-Helman key exchange protocol. Unfortunately Yang's protocol still suffered from the replay attack. In [4] the authors produced a new secure authentication and key agreement protocol called NAKE to solve the existing problems in the original proposal. The scheme assumes that the communication parties must share a common secret number k, but an adversary can easily launch the forgery-attack to act as the server or the user client. In [5] Yoon et al. demonstrates that proposed SIP authentication schemes are not secure against attacks such as offline password guessing attack, Denning-Sacco attacks and stolen verifier attacks. They propose a new SIP authentication scheme in a converged VoIP network based on ECC in order to overcome security problems. However, Yoon et al. protocol was still not suitable for different SIP domains. In [6] Wang and Zhang proposed a new authentication and key agreement mechanism (SAKA) based on certificate-less public key cryptography, to conquer many forms of attacks in SIP authentication. The proposed protocol suffers from heavy computation cost. Also, Zhang et al. in [7] proposed an efficient authentication for SIP using smart card based on ECC. The proposed protocol can resist various attacks and provides efficient password updating. Recently Arshad and Ikram [8] proposed an authentication protocol based on elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem for SIP. However, their protocol suffered from off-line pass- word guessing attacks, for that Yel et al. in [3] adopted the smart card to construct an authentication protocol based on ECC for SIP. Liping et al. [9] confirm that Yel's protocol involved the time synchronization problem.
Preliminaries
In this section, the SIP architecture and SIP authentication procedure are introduced. Then, we briefly review the fundamentals of ECC and digital signature logarithm on ECC (ECDSA).
SIP Architecture
The SIP is a general purpose application layer signaling protocol [10] that is used to create, modify and terminate multimedia session such as VoIP calls. The SIP architecture is composed of a user agent client, proxy server, redirect server, register server and location server [8] (Fig. 1) . The user agent is a logical entity such as a caller or a callee. Proxy server forwards a request and response between a caller and callee. Redirect server accepts requests and replies to the client with a response message. Location server maintains information on the current location of the user agent.
SIP Authentication Procedure
SIP authentication scheme works similarly to HTTP digest authentication [11] , in which a nonce value is used in challenging the target. The response includes a checksum of the username, password, and nonce value [6] . Here is an example flow of authentication mechanism in SIP (Fig. 2 ).
1. client → server: Request. The client sends a request to the server.
2. server → client: Challenge(nonce, realm). Server generates a challenge that includes a nonce and client's realm.
3. client → server: Response(nonce, realm, username, response). The client computes the response = F(nonce, realm, username, response). Then the client sends the Response to the server.
4. According to the username, the server extracts the client's password. Then the server verifies whether the nonce is correct. If is, the server computes F(nonce, username, password, realm) and use it to make a comparison with the response. If they match, the server authenticates the identity of the client.
Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC)
An elliptic curve is a cubic equation of the form: E : y 2 + axy + by = x 3 + cx 2 + dx + e, where a, b, c, and e are real numbers. Let F p denote the finite of points where p is a large prime number and containing x, y. We focus on the finite field of ECC, the mathematical equation of ECC to be of form:
The arithmetic of elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem (ECDLP) is given points Q and P.
Where Q, P ∈ F p , and compute Q = α × P it is hard to determine α given Q and P. In view of shortness, we omit the details and refer to [8] , [12] . A key exchange between e.g. Alice and Bob can be accomplished as follows:
• Alice generates a random integer a ∈ Z * p and compute K A = a × P and sends K A to Bob.
• Bob generates a random integer b ∈ Z * p and compute K B = b × P and sends K B to Alice.
• Alice can compute shared key SK A = a×K B = a×b× ×P and Bob can compute shared key
In this manner if we would like to find SK A = SK B , to break this scheme, we would face ECDLP, which is a hard and complex mathematical problem.
Digital Signature Algorithm Using Elliptic Curve (ECDSA)
In procedure for generating signature using the ECDSA to sign a message m an entity A with domain parameters (E, P, n, a, b, h) and associated key pair(d, Q) the following procedure is used:
1. select a random or pseudorandom integer k, 2. compute kP = (x 1 , y 1 ) and r = x 1 mod n; if r = 0 go to step 1. 
Proposed Authentication Scheme
In this section, a new authenticated key agreement of protocol SIP using ECDSA is proposed. The proposed scheme achieves mutual authentication between different SIP domains, the public key is computed directly from the signature of third trust party (TTP) on the user's identity. The proposed scheme comprises four phases: initialization, registration, mutual authentication, and the password change. The notations adopted through this paper are summarized in Table 1 . The whole process is summarized in Table 2 . 
Initialization Phase
A trusted authority (TA) was defined in each SIP domain to issue the private keys to the entities in the same domain. All entities have agreed upon a high elliptic curve E defined over a finite field, which is used with a base point generator P of prime order n. TA selects a random number s T ∈ Z * p as his private key, and then computes his public key PK T (PK T = s T × P). Then TA keeps s T and publishes the system parameters (PK T , P, n, G, h). Each eligible server S i selects a random k i , computes K i = k i × P and sends (SID i , K i ) to TA. TA chooses a random number t, compute x = t × P and compute the signature parameters (r i , s i ) as follows:
then compute the parameters:
Next, TA sends (R i , S i ) to the server over a secure channel, upon receiving (R i , S i ) the server computes his secret key S key = S i × k i and his public key P key = S key × P. Shared key:
Registration Phase
When a new user (Alice) wants to register with the server S, it performs the following process with TA to complete the registration process:
• Step R 1 . Alice first selects her identity ID A , password PW A , and a random number k. Next, computes K A = k × P. Then, Alice sends {ID A , PW A , K A } to TA over a secure channel.
• Step R 2 . After receiving the information, TA generates a random value t and computes x = t.P, the signature parameters (r A , s A ) for Alice using previous equations. Next, TA computes the following parameters using her secret key s and the received message from Alice:
Now the public key of Alice (PK A ) with the following equation:
In the end, TA personalizes a smart card with the secret parameters (m A , R A , PK A , K A ) and delivers it to Alice through a secure channel.
• 
Mutual Authentication Phase
Assume that Alice wants to communicate with the remote SIP server she must enter her user name ID A and her password PW A . During the authentication process, Alice and the SIP server S perform the following steps to achieve mutual authentication and key negotiation.
Step 1 -Alice → server: Request ID A , R A , T A First, Alice inputs her identity ID A and password, then randomly chooses a number a ∈ Z * p for computing T A = a × P, after that, she sends the request ID A , R A , T A to the server S over a public channel.
Step 2 -server → Alice: Challenge R s , T s , Auth s , realm . The server receives the REQUEST ID A , R A , T A message and performs the following operations to challenge Alice:
• generate a random value b and compute T s = b × P,
• obtain the shared session key SK s = b.P + S s .T A ,
• calculate c 2 = h(SK s ),
• generate the authentication information Auth s = h(nonce realm ID A ID s T A T s c 2 ). After that, the server sends the Challenge R s , T s , Auth s , realm message to Alice.
Step 3 -Upon receiving the Challenge message, Alice computes the public key of the server and session key with the equations:
check the validity of the received message Auth s with the computed value h(nonce realm ID A ID s T A T s c 3 ).
Step 4 -Alice → server: Response nonce, realm, Auth A . After the server authentication phase, Alice computes c 3 = h(SK A ) and calculates the response value Auth A = h(nonce realm ID A ID s T A T s c 2 c 3 ). Then send Response message nonce, realm, Auth A to the server.
Step 5 -After receiving the message Response nonce, realm, Auth A , the SIP server S checks whether the following equation holds Auth A = h(nonce + 1 realm ID A ID s T A T s c 2 ). If yes, the server S assures the legality of Alice. Otherwise, it stops the authentication process.
After finishing mutual authentication between the server S and Alice, both of them can compute session key with the following equations:
Password Changing Phase
During the password changing phase, Alice can change her PW A freely and securely, without any interaction with TA. The smart card can change password itself after performing the following steps:
Step 1. Alice inputs the original ID A and PW A , to the smart card and computes s A = m i − h(PW A K A ) check whether (s A × P) is equal to PK A stored in the smart card. If not, the request is rejected.
Step 2 
Discussion
In this section, we evaluate a security and performance analysis of proposed SIP authentication scheme. The evaluation is divided into two parts: security analysis and comparison with other related approaches in terms of functionality and computational cost.
Security Analysis
Replay attack. Suppose an attacker Bob replays a request message (ID A , R A , K * A , T * A ) and response message (none * , realm, Auth * A ) to impersonate Alice. In the proposed scheme, the SIP server will detect this replay and believe Bob to be illegal, this is because Bob cannot construct a valid Auth s .
Offline password guessing attack. In proposed scheme, the password is stored in the smart card, thus, an adversary is unable to guess the password in the transmitting SIP message.
Mutual authentication. The user (Alice) and the SIP server can verify the identity of each other via Auth A and Auth s . Therefore, the proposed scheme achieves mutual authentication between the user and the server.
Man in the middle attack. An adversary Bob cannot launch the man in the middle attack to fraud the server or user client. Because he needs to pass the verification He cannot extract the integer "a" because it is protected by elliptic curve logarithm discrete problem. Thus Bob cannot construct the session key. The forward secrecy is provided. Data integrity. The shared secret key is obtained during the mutual authentication process. The server can check if the data received from the Alice is correct or not and the same thing for Alice. Therefore, proposed scheme supporting data integrity.
Performance Comparison
The computation costs of the proposed scheme and previously reported schemes are shown in the Table 3 . In general, an 160 bit ECC could offer approximately the same level of security as RSA with 1024 bit key. We divide the computation cost of our scheme into three parts including registration phase, mutual authentication phase, and session key agreement phase. In registration phase, our approach requires two scalar multiplications of elliptic curve. In mutual authentication phase, it needs six scalar multiplications of elliptic curve, two additions of elliptic curve and eight hashing operations. In session key agreement phase, our scheme requires two scalar multiplications of elliptic curve. The total computation cost is 10T m + 2T a + 8T h . As shown in Table 3 , the approaches no. 2, 3 and 4 reduce the computation cost significantly, but their protocols have some security weakness. The functionality comparison between our scheme and others related scheme is reported in Table 4 . Screamingly obvious, proposed scheme can not only solve the security weakness of SIP server, also it is more suitable for different SIP domains.
Conclusion
This paper proposes a new authentication and key agreement mechanism using Digital Signature Algorithm Based on ECC, which achieves mutual authentication and key negotiation. Furthermore, the proposed scheme could resist several attacks, such as insider attacks, off-line password guessing attacks, stolen verifier attacks and replay attack. Proposed scheme shows that the corrupted TA cannot obtain the long-term private keys of user clients and the registered servers to launch the forgery attack. Moreover, the proposed authentication protocol is more suitable to authenticate users with different SIP domains.
